| 1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647484950515253545556575859606162636465666768697071727374 |
- # cameraserver - camera daemon
- type cameraserver, domain;
- type cameraserver_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
- type cameraserver_tmpfs, file_type;
- binder_use(cameraserver)
- binder_call(cameraserver, binderservicedomain)
- binder_call(cameraserver, appdomain)
- binder_service(cameraserver)
- hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_camera)
- hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_graphics_allocator)
- allow cameraserver ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
- # Talk with graphics composer fences
- allow cameraserver hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
- add_service(cameraserver, cameraserver_service)
- add_hwservice(cameraserver, fwk_camera_hwservice)
- allow cameraserver activity_service:service_manager find;
- allow cameraserver appops_service:service_manager find;
- allow cameraserver audioserver_service:service_manager find;
- allow cameraserver batterystats_service:service_manager find;
- allow cameraserver cameraproxy_service:service_manager find;
- allow cameraserver mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
- allow cameraserver processinfo_service:service_manager find;
- allow cameraserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
- allow cameraserver sensor_privacy_service:service_manager find;
- allow cameraserver surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
- allow cameraserver hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
- ###
- ### neverallow rules
- ###
- # cameraserver should never execute any executable without a
- # domain transition
- neverallow cameraserver { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
- # The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
- # restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
- # permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
- # hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
- # hardware/content. Etc.
- #
- # Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
- # permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
- # Lengthier explanation here:
- # https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
- neverallow cameraserver domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
- # Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
- allow cameraserver adbd:fd use;
- allow cameraserver adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
- allow cameraserver shell:fd use;
- allow cameraserver shell:unix_stream_socket { read write };
- allow cameraserver shell:fifo_file { read write };
- # Allow to talk with media codec
- allow cameraserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
- hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_codec2)
- hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_omx)
- hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_allocator)
- # Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
- userdebug_or_eng(`
- allow cameraserver su:fd use;
- allow cameraserver su:fifo_file { read write };
- allow cameraserver su:unix_stream_socket { read write };
- ')
|
